Taking it in turn: an experimental test of theories of the household by Munro, Alistair et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Taking it in turn: an experimental test of
theories of the household
Alistair Munro and Tara McNally and Danail Popov
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Japan
15. May 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8976/
MPRA Paper No. 8976, posted 6. June 2008 07:45 UTC
Taking it in turn: an experimental test of theories of the household. 
by 
Alistair Munro
*,‡
, 
Tara McNally* 
and 
Danail Popov* 
 
 
 
* Department of Economics, Royal Holloway College, University of London, Egham, TW20 
0EX. 
‡ (Corresponding author. Email to alistair-munro@grips.ac.jp): National Graduate Institute for 
Policy Studies, Tokyo, Japan. 
 2 
  
Abstract. 
Using a sample of established couples, we conduct an experiment on household 
decision-making. Individual partners first make a series of dichotomous choices between 
household goods and vouchers for experiences and then the couple jointly face the same 
choices. A random lottery device is used to incentivize the decisions. We find clear 
evidence of turn-taking as a method of resolving disagreements. In other words, when 
one partner wins one disputed question, it raises the probability that the other partner 
wins the next dispute. Given the arbitrary order of the questions this suggests that 
standard decision-theoretic models of household behaviour are inadequate and that 
instead, much behaviour might be concerned with relationship maintenance rather than 
the allocation of goods. 
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Introduction.
∗
 
Turn-taking is a well-known part of the story of how established groups make a sequence of 
decisions when there is conflict over the best options. If one person gets their preferred option in 
one decision, then it makes them more likely to yield to other members of the group on the next 
contested decision. 
 
Turn-taking may arise for a number of reasons. In one class of explanations, it may be a means 
of sharing the gains from bargaining over a sequence of discrete choices, especially when side-
payments are not possible. From a non-cooperative bargaining perspective, (e.g. Lau and Mui, 
2003), it may also be a method for enforcing a Nash equilibrium of a repeated game. These 
explanations of turn-taking are intuitive and straightforward. However, there is a second notion 
that is less easily rationalised within a traditional1 game theoretic framework, but which is also 
familiar from real life and readily discernible within the social psychology literature on 
household decision-making (e.g. Nock, 1989). In this version, against a backdrop of heightened 
emotions and deep vulnerability, decisions are used as a vehicle to exchange signals about 
understanding, mutual respect, love and so on.2 A central purpose of turn-taking is then to 
reassure and reward, to promote relationship specific capital (Becker, 1981), what is often 
termed, relationship maintenance (e.g. Stafford and Canary, 1991). 
 
Within traditional decision-theoretic models the primitives are the set of options and the 
preferences of the individuals over resource allocations. Allowing for a stochastic element to 
decisions, the pattern of choice should not be dependent on the way the choice set is presented or 
framed. Where group choice is concerned, many formal models also incorporate a preference 
aggregation component, but retain the choice set and preferences as primitives. Economic 
models of the household, such as the unitary model or collective choice models (Browning and 
                                                 
∗ The work reported here was financed by the UK’s ESRC, grant no. RES-000-22-2081. We thank Kim Corfman 
and Donald Lehmann for providing unpublished details of their work.  
1 By traditional we mean a framework where the utility, Ui of player i is a function of material payoffs, M, 
IRMU i →: , but not beliefs about other players’ intentions as in psychological game theory. Note, M may 
include within it the material payoffs of other players – in other words the framework does not exclude altruism, 
envy etc.  
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Chiappori, 1998) most clearly fit this description, but it also applies to a broader class of models 
from the consumer psychology literature such as the widely cited theory of group decisions 
offered by Davis, 1973. Traditional game theoretic motives for turn-taking are entirely consistent 
with this framework.  However, in the relationship maintenance story the pattern of dispute 
resolution may depend on the order in which the choice set is presented. Thus, if relationship 
maintenance is important, then a model of household decision-making based solely on the 
primitives of preference over goods can be flawed. 
 
Although the relationship maintenance story of household decision-making may be appealing, 
direct evidence from actual choices is scant. So, in this paper we report on an experiment on a 
sample of established couples who were asked to make a series of dichotomous choices between 
widely available goods, first separately and then jointly. A distinctive feature of our experiment 
is that the choices made individually and jointly are incentivised using the familiar random 
lottery system. Though many choices were not disputed (i.e. the individual partners separately 
chose the same option), we find clear evidence for turn-taking in the resolution of those choices 
where individual answers diverged. Since the couples had the whole set of questions in front of 
them as they made their joint decisions, we take this as evidence against  theories of household 
decision-making in which only preferences over goods matter.  
 
The plan of the remainder of the paper is as follows: in the next section we provide a brief 
background to the experiment and consider the relevant literature. In section 3, we describe the 
experimental procedure with results presented in the following section. Section 5 concludes the 
paper. Before going on though, it is worth making two clarifying remarks that anticipate our 
results. 
 
First, much of the recent experimental work on individual decision-making is concerned with 
whether individuals are rational. Our paper has nothing to say on this particular issue for 
couples. One reason is that group choice models require a preference aggregation component. 
                                                                                                                                                       
2 Paul Simon, quoted in Lich-Tyler, 2001, writes that ‘negotiations and love songs are often mistaken for one and 
the same. This is a general theme of our paper. 
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Since this component is undefined by axioms of rational choice3 and can legitimately vary 
between households, it can be difficult to examine whether collective choice is rational or 
otherwise. One might still question whether it is rational for a group’s choice to depend on the 
order in which decisions are presented. After all, many experiments on the framing invariance of 
individual choice are tests of rationality. Our contention is simply that turn-taking in ongoing 
groups can be rational, in part because the objects of preference are not confined to the 
consumption of goods.  
 
Our second preliminary remark is that our design and our results do not presume that 
relationship maintenance is the only force driving household decisions. There is abundant 
evidence of the role played by power, expertise and preference intensity in household decisions 
(e.g. Corfman et al, 1994). The aim therefore of the present experiment is to see whether turn-
taking also plays a part. 
 
 
Background and Design. 
As we noted above, turn-taking may have different bases. Within traditional game theory, it may 
be part of equilibrium in a repeated game. Consider for instance the ‘Battle of the Sexes’ game 
depicted in Figure 1. In this familiar story, the players have some wish to coordinate their 
actions. Two alternative options are available, each favoured by one person. There are three 
Nash equilibria: two pure and one mixed. In an infinitely repeated version of this game with two 
sufficiently patient players the Folk theorem implies that any feasible average pair of payoffs 
greater than (0,0) can be achieved in a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. In particular an 
average of (3.5,3.5) can be achieved by alternating the two strategy pairs (A,A) and (B,B). Lau 
and Mui, 2003, show how this symmetric and efficient outcome can be brought about through a 
process of trial and error, while Browning and Colman, 2004, demonstrate the evolutionary 
stability of turn-taking in some repeated versions of the Battle of the Sexes. In an experiment 
using US college students, Prabrey 1992, uses a game similar to the Battle of the Sexes to show 
that turn-taking is the most popular strategy in indefinitely repeated versions of the game. 
                                                 
3 The Pareto principle might seem like a natural candidate for a rational aggregation rule, but this is not a feature of 
some non-cooperative theories of household behaviour e.g. Chen and Woolley, 2000. 
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Similarly Sonsino and Sirota, 2003, find that 57% of their subjects converge to an alternating 
pattern of play in a Battle of the Sexes experiment played in gender-mixed pairs of engineering 
students. They also find that anonymity reduces but does not eliminate this kind of reciprocating 
behaviour. 
 
  Player 2 
  A B 
Player 1 A 5,2 0,0 
 B 0,0 2,5 
Figure 1. A Battle of the Sexes Game. 
In cooperative games, alternation may also be an effective means of sharing the spoils from 
repeated bargaining in a manner that avoids exit when utility is non-transferable. Suppose for 
instance that two individuals bargain in a relationship that may last indefinitely. Option A is 
always worth 3 to player 1 and option B is worthless to her in all periods. Option A is worth 
nothing in all periods for player 2, whereas option B is always worth 3. Each player discounts 
the future by 50% per period and present value of the outside option is always 2.  In this 
situation, two periods in which the same player loses produces a net present value of at most 1.5. 
Hence, even if they subsequently get their preferred option in all future periods, two periods 
without a win would lead to exit and the end of the game. Alternation is potentially sustainable, 
though and produces a present value of 4 to the person who gets their preferred option initially 
and 2 for the partner.  
 
These are examples of what Sobel, 2005 calls instrumental reciprocity – tit-for-tat behaviour in 
a repeated game by players who are selfish. With intrinsic reciprocity, players have 
interdependent preferences of a type that promotes reciprocating actions. Psychological game 
theory (Geanokopolos et al, 1989, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004) offers one way to 
characterize this behaviour in formal game theoretic terms.4 In that literature, player’s payoffs 
                                                 
4 There are other approaches. Baumeister et al, 1995, note the importance of guilt and its avoidance as a factor in 
decisions. To the extent that people feel guilty for continually winning disputed decisions, then turn-taking can 
mitigate these feelings.  Dufwenberg, 2002, applies this thinking to a marital investment game. 
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depend on beliefs about the intentions behind actions. In other words the utility, Ui  of player i is 
a function of both M, material payoffs and, Bi, i’s beliefs about the players’ choices and beliefs: 
 IRBMU ii →×:  
Generally in this framework individuals wish to be kind to players who are kind to them and 
punish unkind acts with unkindness (Dufwenber and Kirchsteiger, 2004). If not always pressing 
for one’s preferred option is interpreted as kindness by the other player, then he or she may 
respond in a similar manner and turn-taking can arise. 
 
Outside of game theory, much of the formal work on household (and group) decision-making 
rests on the theoretical framework laid out by Davis, 1973. In this paper, Davis proposes that 
decisions are a probabilistic function of three components: the choice set, individual preferences 
and the “social decisions scheme”.5 Thus, as with game theoretic models the pattern of choices 
for a given couple should be independent of the order in which the choices are presented. 
However, the framework initiated by Davis is quite permissive and thus it is not unusual to see 
decision history included as a variable in a Davis-style model of decision-making. For instance, 
Corfman and Gupta, 1992 argue that, “for groups that are not newly formed, the processes and 
outcomes of past decision are often important and should be included in models”, page 54.  
 
A predecessor to the Davis model that is closer to the game theoretic approaches is that 
produced by Polley, 1968. In this model, too though the primitives are the choice set and the 
preferences of the partners. Polley introduces the notion of ‘utility debt’ to describe a situation 
where the resolution of recent disputes is such that one partner is ahead compared to a norm 
representing the long-term distribution of the gains from the relationship. The probability of 
losing a dispute is increased when a person has a utility debt to their partner and thus the model 
contains a mechanism that predicts turn-taking.  
 
Relationship maintenance is a term that refers to strategies and behaviours designed to support 
and nurture a relationship. In non-mathematical theories of household behaviour the idea that 
                                                 
5 Game theoretic models of the household are compatible with Davis’ framework. They are more restrictive because 
they impose equilibrium concepts and this limits the set of permissible social decision schemes. For instance, in 
cooperative models, the social decision scheme must be Pareto efficient.  
  8 
relationship maintenance is a key part of decision-making is common (Nock, 1998). According 
to Stafford and Canary 1991, relationship maintenance strategies include positivity, openness, 
assurances, social network and task sharing. Positivity includes avoiding criticism and being 
cheerful and upbeat; openness refers to being willing to discuss feelings and share emotions; 
assurances include statements of love and commitment; social networks mean spending time 
with a partner’s friends and family and task sharing is fairly self-explanatory.  Each of these 
strategies helps maintain or improve indicators of relationship health, such as liking of partner, 
commitment and mutual control. They are an example of what Messick, 1999, terms ‘alternative 
logics for social settings’. In turn the indicators are correlated with the persistence of the 
relationship and its satisfaction (Rubin, 1970). Turn-taking can be a component of several 
maintenance strategies. If the task is to make a decision, then turn-taking implies a shared 
responsibility for household choices. Turn-taking may also be associated with assurances: when 
a partner gives way on one choice it signals to the other partner that their preferences are 
understood and valued (Park et al, 1995). Taking it in turn might also be linked to positivity and 
openness – since it enables the partners to exchange signals about preference intensity without at 
the same time signalling intransigence and an undiscriminating rejection of the partner’s wishes. 
 
In theory, there may be a reconsideration after all pending decisions have been examined once by 
the partners. However, sincerity and honesty are often valued features of communication in a 
long-term relationship (Rubin, 1970). To reopen one decision after others have been apparently 
agreed may therefore send a damaging signal about the honesty of previous discussions.  In short 
therefore, the relationship maintenance story is not simply about agreeing on consumption. It is 
also about the process by which agreement is reached, since this may affect each person’s 
feelings for their partner. As such even when the consumption set is fixed, the order in which 
decisions are first considered can have an impact on the final pattern of consumption.  It is this 
feature that distinguishes it from the traditional game theoretic model or the Davis framework. 
Separating the relationship maintenance story and psychological game theory is less simple as 
psychological game theory is very close to the spirit behind relationship maintenance. One 
reason is that even within a relationship maintenance perspective, players may use feelings 
strategically, as Davis, 1976 observes: 
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‘Waiting for the "next purchase" is an obvious approach if one feels that one will lose or 
"use up" goodwill by forcing a showdown on a contested decision. The husband can say, 
for example, "O.K., you buy the fur coat but I'm going to take the two-week fishing 
vacation with the boys."’ Davis, 1976, page 256. 
Moreover, psychological game theory is clearly work-in-progress and so it would be churlish to 
focus on the set of existing models rather than the spirit of the approach with its emphasis on 
beliefs about intentions as an important component of utility. For the purposes of this study, the 
key point though is that any psychological game theoretic model in which beliefs Bi about 
intentions depend only on a) the final actions taken and b) the choice set from which these 
actions were selected, will not be compatible with widespread turn-taking in joint decisions.  
 
Systematic evidence of turn-taking is relatively limited but comes from a variety of situations in 
which ongoing groups make discrete decisions. Ostrom, 1990, describes norms of turn-taking in 
agricultural communities worldwide. For instance, amongst Spanish farmers in Valencia taking 
water from irrigation canals is governed by principles of alternation. Within households, Gupta 
and Stecker, 1993, show that brand-switching in household purchase data is consistent with a 
model in which spouses take it in turn to choose their preferred option. They do not though have 
direct evidence on turn-taking. For households, perhaps the clearest data is provided by results 
from a pioneering experiment run by Corfman and Lehmann, 1987 which forms a direct 
precedent for our work. Both partners were first presented separately with a series of 54 items 
and asked to answer questions about their preference intensities for the items, likelihood of 
future purchase, reservation price etc. From their answers the researchers created a subset of 
dichotomous decisions, 12-18 questions for each of the 62 couples. Each of the pairs of goods 
was chosen in anticipation that the partners would have different preferences. These sets, which 
then differed between households, were subsequently shown to the couples. For each question 
they were asked first to indicate their individual preference intensity towards both of the options 
and then to come to a decision on the item that they would choose jointly. Around 39% of the 
questions did prompt disagreement and in an OLS analysis of the probability of winning a 
dispute, Corfman and Lehmann, 1987 found a small but significant (p<0.05) tendency for 
partners who ‘won’ on one question to have a lower probability of winning a subsequent 
disputed question. The importance of decision history has also been reported by Qualls and 
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Jaffe, 1992 and more recently by Ward, 2006, who used 61 US couples in an experiment closely 
modelled on that employed by Corfman and Lehmann. She also noted that decision history was 
more important for tasks where partners expressed strong preferences for one of the products.  
 
One theoretical possibility with these results is that the partners were strategic in the first phase – 
reporting preferences so as to maximize the chances of preferred goods appearing in the second 
stage of the experiment. One obvious counter is that the choices in the experiment were 
hypothetical which makes strategic behaviour in the first phase rather pointless. However, this 
then raises the issue of the incentives in the second stage of the experiment, wherein subjects 
were asked first to report preference intensity and then to resolve their differences. Another 
potentially confounding issue is the attrition of couples between the first stage of the experiment 
and the second. It is conceivable that these factors may produce turn-taking – the hypothetical 
nature of the experiment may produce heuristics that minimize decision effort for instance.  
 
Su et al, 2003, use a conjoint analysis with three decisions. Subjects first rank the options in each 
decision, but unlike the other studies reported here, there is no selection of goods between stages 
and no attrition between stages. Thus there is no incentive to misrepresent preferences so as to 
influence the choice set. However, they use a mail-based survey so that monitoring of subjects 
was not possible and subjects were also therefore able to see all parts of the experiment before 
answering any questions.  Because there are several options to rank in each decision, a simple 
test of whether partners take it in turns to win is hard to construct. However, intriguingly, they 
find that self-reported levels of coercion by partners are negatively linked to coercive behaviour 
in the previous decision and positively linked to dissatisfaction with the preceding decision. 
 
Overall therefore, there have been a few experiments which have found turn-taking in some 
form or other. The lack of incentives, subject monitoring and other design issues means that in 
none of them is there a clear cut test of no-turn-taking when real choices are involved. As a 
result we design an experiment to avoid these possible weaknesses. The experiment takes place 
under our gaze with subjects separated for the first stage. The second stage of the experiment 
follows on immediately from the first to avoid attrition in the sample. Third, the tasks in the 
second stage were exactly the same as in the first stage. Fourth, all the tasks were simple 
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dichotomous choices, so it would be apparent when couples differed in preferences and when 
one person won. Finally we used a random lottery device to incentivize the decisions from all 
parts of the experiment. In other words, out of all the choices made by the couple one was picked 
at random to be executed at the end of the experiment. More details about the experimental 
procedure follow in the next section.  
 
 
Method. 
Subjects were recruited at two community events hosted by Royal Holloway, University of 
London, U.K. during the summer of 2007. The first was a garden party – a fair for the local 
community with craft stalls, food and entertainment; the second event was part of a nationwide 
heritage day in which buildings of architectural interest were opened to the public.  Fifty couples 
took part in the first event and 32 in the second. On each day we set up a stall with advertising 
material and with posters listing prizes.  We also handed out fliers around the event. 
 
Couples passing the stall run by the experiments were invited to take part in the experiment. At 
this stage we did not know whether individuals were part of a couple, so we simply asked any 
passing adults if ‘they were with their partner today’. If they answered positively, we probed 
further to see if they satisfied the criteria for the sample: were they both 21 or over, were they 
living together as a couple and had they been together for over one year. If they met the criteria 
and agreed to take part, they were given introductory instructions and descriptions of the prizes 
by the experimenters. Each individual was then asked to fill in separately the first part of the 
experiment which consisted of the individual choice questions (followed by a brief socio-
demographic questionnaire). In order to keep the process gender neutral,6 one member of each 
couple was labelled ‘Triangle’ and ‘Wave’ at random at the start of the experiment. On the 
questionnaire in section 2, their answers were labelled as such. Tables and chairs were set out to 
allow participants to sit down well apart from one another and the subjects were monitored by 
the researchers to prevent collaboration.  If children were present, the subjects were monitored 
and reminded to answer the questions without their influence. Some toys were also provided to 
keep the children occupied. 
  12 
 
Appendix A lists the full set of goods used and appendix B provides a sample pair of questions. 
The goods were initially selected on the basis of answers given by couples taking part in a 
previous experiment (Bateman, McNally and Munro, 2007). They mix some low value goods 
with vouchers for popular retailers, some personal and household goods and vouchers for dating 
‘experiences’ such as a meal and show in London’s West End theatre district. This last class 
were bought from leading internet-based suppliers and are well-known gift purchases in the UK. 
They are flexible and can typically be enjoyed at a variety of venues, within one year of 
purchase. Recipients cannot exchange them for cash. The prizes varied in face value from DVDs 
(retailing for around £10 or $20) up to some of the experiences which cost over £110 ($220).  
 
In providing instructions for the first part of the experiment we did not tell the subjects the 
nature of the second part. We only specified that there was a second part and that one question 
chosen at random from their answers, their partner’s answers or from the second part of the 
experiment would be chosen as the real question and their supplied responses would be binding. 
 
We produced two versions of the questionnaire with the same tasks but in a different order. Each 
couple was randomly allocated to one version or the other (i.e. the partners in a couple always 
saw the same order). 
 
After both partners had completed the first section we tallied their choices and transferred the 
information onto the questionnaire for section two of the experiment. In this section the subjects 
were jointly presented with the same set of questions from the first section and then asked to 
make a joint choice. So that there could be no issue of recall bias, the questionnaire included on 
it details of the choices made by both partners in the first section of the experiment. Appendix C 
provides one page of this section of the experiment. Once section 2 had been completed a 
random lottery device (bingo chips drawn from a bag) was used to select the question that would 
be for real. The couple was then notified of the relevant prize and the experiment ended.7 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
6 In fact all the couples were heterosexual in this experiment. 
7 Prizes were ordered after the experiment and delivered to the participants in the following week. 
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After the first event two things became clear: first there was some scope for asking subjects to 
answer more than the 12 questions each of them faced; secondly and more seriously, for many 
questions there was a large level of agreement within couples (around 65% of all items).8 This 
limited the value of the dataset. Consequently we ran focus groups to identify more goods with a 
reasonable probability of disagreement and then replaced some questions and added a few more. 
As a result, at the second event subjects were asked to answer 15 questions each and 
disagreement levels increased to around 45%. Apart from this the format remained the same. 
 
Results 
Figure Two sets out some descriptive data from the combined sample, based on individual 
responses from the questionnaire at the end of the first section. At the time of the experiment, on 
average, couples taking part had lived together for just over 19 years and their mean age was 49. 
The oldest person was 80 and the youngest 22. The modal length of time together was 1 year, 
but as the chart shows, this simply reflects the wide dispersion of the sample on this measure. 
The majority of couples were in long-established relationships with 55 years as the longest self-
reported time as a couple. About 70% were married. As is common the pattern of children was 
bimodal with 0 as the most frequent answer and 2 as the other typical response. Around 75% of 
couples gave the same answer for living together, while just over 60% agreed on the description 
which matched most closely their financial arrangements. Matching the results of Bateman and 
Munro, 2005, 42% agreed on both questions. Sharing everything was the most common financial 
arrangement with the overwhelming majority of the other subjects stating that one partner had 
principle control while the other kept some money for personal use. The most commonly 
reported occupation was ‘retired’. For those in work, a wide variety of occupations were 
reported including electrician, clerk, sales manager, reflexologist and driving instructor. Using 
the UK’s Labour Force Survey occupation codes from after 2001 around 2/3 of the responses 
would be classified as professional/managerial or in other skilled and semi-skilled jobs. 
 
                                                 
8 This should not be seen as evidence of assortative mating – when we test to see if the levels of agreement we find 
were higher than that obtainable if a random male from our sample were matched with a random female we find no 
significant difference. 
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Figure 2 Descriptive Information on the full data set. 
 
Before we set out the main results of the paper, we present some subsidiary evidence on 
transitivity and the Pareto principle. We have two pairs of three questions for the first of these 
tests. Out of 200 individual observations we have only 7 instances where individuals fail to 
make answers consistent with transitivity and out of 100 joint choices we have just one case 
where transitivity is rejected in joint choice. This compares favourably with experiments 
involving relatively abstract lotteries where inconsistency is relatively common (Starmer,  2000). 
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Similarly, Bateman and Munro, 2005, report an experiment involving choices between lotteries 
made by couples and find a much higher level of inconsistency than that found here. 
 
For couples to be Pareto efficient, in instances where they have made the same choice in section 
one, they would need to choose the same option jointly in section two. Eight couples showed 
some evidence contrary to Pareto efficiency out of a total of 419 instances when both couples 
chose the same option (A or B) in section one of the experiment. Thus reversals of joint 
preference are rare, though not unknown and no couple reverses more than once. Again though, 
and perhaps because we are dealing with goods rather than lotteries, preference reversals are 
much rarer than the 15% incidence reported in Bateman and Munro, 2005 for instance. Overall 
therefore there is much coherence in the data. 
 
Out of the 82 couples we have 380 disputed questions. The median number of disagreements per 
couple was 4 and the maximum number encountered was 10 (see figure 3).   
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Although as would be anticipated, Triangle wins near enough half of all disputes (51.9%), across 
couples we have a wide dispersion of win rates. Figure 4 summarises this information, which 
excludes the one couple who did not disagree on any answers. Twenty-two couples split the wins 
50:50, but otherwise there is substantial variation including 13 cases where one partner won all 
disputes. In six of these cases the dominant partner was male. Overall, women won 51.4% of 
disputed decisions. 
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Figure 4. Cumulative Distribution of Win Rates. 
As an illustration of our null hypothesis and test statistic consider the pattern of responses below 
for a sequence of eight questions. In the first question the couple give the same answers 
individually; in the second case they disagree and Wave gets their preferred option and so on. 
 
Agree T loses T loses T wins Agree T wins T loses Agree 
 
In this example, there are five disputes and T loses on 3 occasions. Out of these three cases 
where T loses, there are two cases when there is at least one subsequent dispute. In the third 
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occasion that T loses, there is no subsequent dispute. So, given T loses a dispute, T loses the 
subsequent dispute 50% of the time, which is less than the 60% unconditional chance that T will 
lose a dispute. However, this is not the correct comparison. Once we know a dispute has been 
lost then given the total number of disputes lost by T, one degree of freedom about what can 
happen in other disputes is removed. This is most clearly seen in the case where there are only 
two disputes and T loses the first of these. The unconditional proportion of losses is 0.5, but the 
probability of two consecutive losses is zero.  Essentially therefore we have to compare the 
conditional probability that the next dispute is lost, to the probability that another, randomly 
chosen dispute is lost. 
 
More formally, let d = the number of disputed questions and let l = the number of disputes lost 
by Triangle and let k = the number of pairs of consecutive disputes lost by Triangle.  For each of 
these couples we compute two proportions: P(L), the probability that the Triangle player loses a 
dispute, and the conditional proportion of disputes lost by Triangle, given that the previous 
dispute was also lost, P(L│L). Each of these calculated proportions includes a correction to 
allow for the nature for the sample.  
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Here i is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the last disputed question is lost by 
Triangle and 0 otherwise. Our hypotheses are then: 
 
H0: P(L) = P(L│L). 
H1: P(L) > P(L│L). 
 
If there is no negative serial correlation and the null hypothesis is true, then there is an equal 
chance that P(L│L) is higher or lower than the first proportion. We therefore conduct a sign test 
on the difference between P(Loss) and P(Loss│Loss), with a null hypothesis that P(Loss) is 
greater than P(Loss│Loss) for 50% of the sample. The alternative hypothesis is that P(Loss) is 
more frequently higher than P(Loss│Loss). 
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As could be seen from Figure Three, we have 1 couple with no disputes and 2 couples with 1 
dispute. In addition we have 3 couples where the solitary dispute lost by Triangle is also the last 
dispute. We drop these 6 cases from our sample. In 54 out of the remaining 76 cases, (0.71) we 
find that the conditional probability of losing is strictly lower than the unconditional probability. 
A binomial test produces z = 4.064, p = 0.000 (to 3 significant figures). For the separate sub-
samples the relevant z scores are 2.47 (event B, n=30) and 5.33 (part A, n=46). Both of these 
have p values below 0.01. Thus we reject the null in favour of the alternative hypothesis of 
negative serial correlation in the resolution of disputes. 
 
For small levels of disagreement, negative serial correlation might simply reflect the desire 
amongst a couple to equalize some measure of gains. Thus with only two disagreements we 
might expect Triangle to win the second if she or he loses the first. To consider this possibility 
we repeat the binomial tests progressively eliminating couples with low levels of disagreement. 
Table 1 summarises the results. We can see that the proportion where P(Loss│Loss) is lower 
than P(L) falls slightly as we exclude more and more couples, but that the result remains robust 
until the sample falls to just 26 couples at which the p value for a one-tailed test is 0.9504. 
(There are 14 couples with 7 or more disagreements; the relevant proportion is 64% for this 
group.) Overall we conclude that the result is not an artefact caused by the inclusion of couples 
with only 2 disagreements. 
 
Table 1. Losing and losing twice in a row 
Couples included 
Number of 
couples 
Proportion where 
frequency falls Z value 
All 76 0.71 4.064*** 
4  or more disagreements 51 0.71 3.226*** 
5 or more disagreements 38 0.68 2.443*** 
6 or more disagreements 26 0.65 1.649 
*** significant at 1% level.  
 
One theoretical possibility is that our results are driven by particular pairs of questions.  As we 
note above, we have three different question orders across the sample, which makes it unlikely 
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that our results are simply due to the sequence of questions. Perhaps more pertinent is the 
additional fact that there are a large number of agreements within our sample, so that in many 
cases disputes are not consecutive questions. Indeed the incidence of the next dispute is spread 
across subsequent questions. For example, the largest number of disputes for a single question is 
40 (out of 82). Only 16 of these couples then disagree about the choice for the subsequent 
question and out of them, one member of the couple wins both questions on 14 occasions. In 
other words, for this particular pair of questions, the data is at variance with the general pattern 
of results. For the remaining 24 couples, the next task where they disagree is scattered across the 
rest of the questionnaire.  More generally, for the sample as a whole, in 45% of the cases where 
consecutive disagreements involve consecutive questions, the partners alternate who wins. 
Where consecutive disputes are separated by one or more questions where the partners agree, 
47% of cases involve alternation of the winning partner. So, in fact, taking it in turn is slightly 
more frequent for the pairs of disputes separated by some period of agreement, though the 
difference is not remotely significant. Overall, therefore we conclude that turn-taking is not an 
artefact of the particular order of the questions used in this experiment. 
 
To analyse the data in a different way, we also run regressions, treating the dataset as a panel and 
using a random effects model to capture the idiosyncratic effects of households. The dependent 
variable in this regression is coded as 1 if the joint choice concurs with the preference expressed 
by the Triangle partner (‘Triangle’). There is a corresponding variable for the Wave partner 
(‘Wave’). Thus if both of these dummy variables are 1 then partners made the same choice 
individually and jointly.  See below for the complete interpretation of these variables. 
 
  Wave 
  Wave=1 Wave=0 
Triangle Triangle=1 Partners agree and stick to 
individual choices 
Partners disagree and Triangle 
predominates 
 Triangle=0 Partners disagree and Wave 
predominates 
Partners agree but reverse 
individual choice 
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According to the null, the probability that the joint choice in task t agrees with the choice made 
by Triangle as an individual should be independent of how past decisions have been resolved. 
According to the alternative hypothesis, the probability of success for Triangle should increase 
when Wave has been successful in the past round, once we control for Triangle’s overall success 
rate. Thus a regression of Triangle on lags of itself, on Triangle’s overall success rate and on 
Wave and lags of Wave provides a framework for testing the hypothesis. 
 
So, we estimate the random effects logit model: 9 
 
tititititititi WinRatebAgreebTrianglebWavebWavebaTriangle ,,4,31,21,1,0, ε++++++= −−  
 
Where i refers to the subject, t refers to the question, Win Rate is the average number of disputes 
won by Triangle and Agree is a dummy that takes the value 1 if Triangle and Wave separately 
have given the same answer. We leave in Agree because of the possibility that individuals 
separately give the same answer but jointly reverse that decision. The error term, εit= εi+uit with 
εi normally distributed and uit having an extreme value distribution. The null hypothesis is that 
b1=0; the alternative is that b1>0. We would also anticipate that b0 < 0, b4 > 0 and b3 > 0.  
 
Table 2 summaries the results (the terms in parentheses are standard errors). For all the models, 
a null hypothesis of no explanatory power is strongly rejected, but an assumption that there is no 
individual level heterogeneity is not rejected. In other words, it is as if there are no systematic 
differences between couples that are not picked up by the Win Rate variable. Not surprisingly 
the effect of overall Win Rate on whether an individual gets their preferred alternative is positive 
and highly significant within the pooled sample and separately in the two sub-samples. 
Similarly, when couples make the same choice separately, then this has a positive impact on the 
probability of that option being chosen. Again this is not a surprise, given that the marginal 
impact of the partner winning is negatively correlated with Triangle winning. Most pertinently 
                                                 
9 Since WinRate is constant within a household, we cannot use a fixed effects model. When we omit the WinRate 
variable and compare the fixed and random effects models, a Hausman test does not reject the random effects model 
against the fixed effects alternative.  
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we see that if Wave wins in the previous round, then Triangle is more likely to win in the current 
round. The coefficient on Wavet-1 is significant at the 5% level, two tailed test for the pooled 
sample and significant at the 1% level for the second sub-sample. For the first sub-sample, the 
coefficient is positive, but not significant. 
 
Since the choice of who is Triangle is random it makes no sense to include demographic features 
directly into the equation when they do not differ between the household members. When we 
include Triangle’s gender and the age gap between the partners, as we do in equation 4, the 
coefficient on Wavet-1 is still significant, but the added variables have very low t values (i.e. the 
Win rate variable subsumes their explanatory power).  Note that the sample is reduced for 
equations 4-6 because of incomplete demographic data from 5 couples.  
 
It is possible that variables that are constant within a couple may affect the coefficients on the 
decision history variable. For instance, older couples might be more or less responsive to a win 
by their partners in the previous round. When we test for this we do not find any effect with age, 
children or years together as a couple. However, as shown in the final two columns, we find a 
difference between married and unmarried couples. For the latter, admittedly small group, there 
is no significant effect of decision history on outcomes. However, for married couples, there is a 
significant effect. Married couples take turns whereas the unmarried do not.10 
                                                 
10 The rate of disputed questions is almost identical between married and unmarried questions. 
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Table 2. Random effects logit model of serially correlated outcomes. 
Equation 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Entire 
sample 
First 
event 
Second 
event 
Entire sample, 
demographics 
Married Unmarried 
Constant -0.059 
(0.660) 
-0.151 
(0.928) 
0.937 
(1.13) 
-0.288 
(0.607) 
-0.775 
(0.745) 
2.04 
(2.27) 
Wavet -5.12*** 
(0.447) 
-4.38*** 
(0.541) 
-6.07*** 
(0.815) 
-5.038*** 
(0.455) 
-4.61*** 
(0.486) 
-7.17*** 
(1.531) 
Wavet-1 0.996** 
(0.452) 
0.736 
(0.615) 
1.80*** 
(0.775) 
0.899** 
(0.451) 
1.27*** 
(0.486) 
-1.374 
(1.824) 
Trianglet-1 0.553 
(0.424) 
0.322 
(0.538) 
0.919 
(0.766) 
0.593 
(0.426) 
0.540 
(0.451) 
0.901 
(1.24) 
Agree 7.15*** 
(0.488) 
6.77*** 
(0.603) 
7.93*** 
(0.883) 
7.044*** 
(0.493) 
6.75*** 
(0.531) 
9.18***  
(1.61) 
Win Rate 3.55*** 
(0.922) 
5.28*** 
(1.825) 
3.92*** 
(1.362) 
2.13*** 
(0.400) 
3.97*** 
(1.056) 
2.54 
(2.680) 
Age difference    -0.035 
(0.046) 
-0.009 
(0.051) 
-0.158 
(0.167) 
Male    0.465 
(0.381) 
0.272 
(0.428) 
1.21 
(1.31) 
Rho 3.6e-07 6.1e-08 6.41e-07 3.2e-0.07 1.44e-07 2.48e-0.07 
Observations 984 540 444 933 694 239 
Couples 82 50 32 77 57 20 
LL -131.9 -83.03 -45.41 -128.3 -107.4 -16.6 
LL test 1 234.4*** 136.08*** 91.46*** 222.2*** 173.4*** 35.4*** 
LL test 2 3.8e-05 4e-06 1.8e-05 3.7e-0.05 0 0 
Notes: Terms in parentheses are standard errors. *** indicates significant at 1% level, one tailed 
test; ** indicates significance at 5% level, two-tailed; * indicates significant at 5% level, one 
tailed test. The number of observations is not a simple multiple of the number of groups, because 
one or two couples did not express preferences for the questions involving alcohol. 
Demographic data is incomplete for 5 couples. 
LL test 1 gives the χ2 for the likelihood ratio test that the equation has no explanatory power. 
LL test 2 gives the χ2 for the likelihood ratio test that rho equals zero (i.e. there is no couple level 
heterogeneity). 
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Thus overall we conclude that, controlling for overall win rate and other factors, there is a serial 
correlation between Triangle winning and the history of how decisions have been resolved. 
When the previous decision is disputed and Triangle has lost the dispute, then Triangle is more 
likely to win in the current decision.  
 
5. Discussion. 
We have presented a novel experiment on household decision-making. Established couples face 
a series of choices separately and then jointly; they are asked to make decisions over the same 
sets of alternatives. Using a random lottery device we provide incentives for them to take each 
part of the experiment seriously. We find firm experimental support for the hypothesis that there 
is turn-taking in the resolution of disputed choices within our sample. In common with Corfman 
and Lehmann, 1987, we find that when one person in the couple has won in a particular dispute, 
then it is more likely that the other person will win the next disputed question. We do not find 
evidence that turn taking is simply a result of any attempt to equalise the gains from disputed 
questions and we do not find any evidence that age or length of time together affects the 
propensity to take turns. However, we do find that married couples take turns more than 
unmarried couples.  
 
These results present something of a challenge to traditional models of household decision-
making in that the order that subjects see the tasks is arbitrary. Traditional models, both from 
economics and from consumer psychology, do not predict this pattern of turn-taking.   As we 
have emphasised, however, our results do not imply that our subjects were irrational. Rather it 
may be that the strategies employed to resolve disputes were more concerned with relationship 
maintenance than in bargaining over goods.  
 
As others have indicated, preference intensity, expertise and raw power are all factors that play a 
part in household decisions and these elements may swamp relationship maintenance at times. 
As a result, the wider significance of our results is not clear. However, taken at face value, they 
suggest that models which attempt to predict household choices, but which are grounded only in 
preferences over goods may be inaccurate. Choices made by households may appear to be 
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capricious when viewed from without the relationship, when in fact they have a stable and 
predictable rationale when viewed from within.11  Viewed alongside earlier work by Corfman 
and Lehman, 1987, Su et al, 2003 and Ward, 2006, these results also pose a challenge to the 
view  that in close relationships individuals pay less attention to rules of fairness (Clarke and 
Grote, 2003).12 Finally, we can only speculate about whether our results apply to other 
established small groups such as organizational teams and ongoing buyer-seller relationships.  
Certainly, much of the literature on on-going transactions within business (e.g. Dwyer et al, 
1987) would be compatible with a relationship maintenance motive for turn-taking. 
                                                 
11 Corfman, 1986, makes this point when examining test-retest reliability of group decisions. 
12 Following their experiments on fairness amongst primates, Brosnan et al, 2005, make a similar claim for 
chimpanzees. They suggest that “individuals in close relationships (marital, family or friendship) follow communal 
rules, which do not pay overt attention to fairness and switch to contingent rule-based behaviour such as equity or 
inequality only when there is stress in the relationship.” P. 257. Our results suggest otherwise. 
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Appendix A. The Goods. 
6 bottles of red wine from Oddbins. 
6 bottles of white wine from Oddbins 
12 bottles of red wine from Oddbins. 
12 bottles of white wine from Oddbins 
£30 Theatre Voucher  
£30 Shoe shop voucher  
DVD of The Last King of Scotland. 
DVD of Amazing Grace  
DVD of  Hot Fuzz 
DVD of  The Painted Veil (2007) 
Dancing experience for two  
Grand Prix karting experience for two 
Do something voucher for Him 
Do something voucher for Her 
£60 Voucher from Marks and Spencer. 
Voucher for Day Spa for 2 people 
  
Man’s watch (choice of 3) 
Constellation luggage set. 
Voucher for Meal at the Ritz for two. 
Ipod Nano 2GB 
Voucher for dinner for 2 and West End 
Theatre.   
Kodak Digital Photo  viewer 
Cookworks Signature whole fruit juicer. 
£25 Gardening Voucher 
£20 Itunes Voucher   
£20 Gardening Voucher 
£20 Voucher from Marks and Spencer  
DVD of The Bourne Supremacy. 
DVD of Casino Royale. 
DVD of Miss Potter 
DVD of The Queen.    
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Appendix C. A Page from the Section 2 questionnaire. 
• In this section for each question tick the option you jointly prefer. 
• Each question also first shows what you each preferred separately. 
• At the end of the experiment one question number from 1-36 will be chosen for your 
household. 
• If it is one of the questions from this section (25-36) you will get the prize you say you 
jointly prefer. 
 
25 Voucher for Meal at the Ritz for two.  Ipod Nano 2GB, Silver 
           
   Triangle preferred         
   Wave preferred       
   We prefer        
    
26 Voucher for dinner for 2 and West End Theatre 
tickets.   
 Digital Photo  viewer 
          
   Triangle preferred       
   Wave preferred       
   We prefer        
    
27 Karting experience for 2 people  Voucher for dinner for 2 and West End Theatre 
    
   Triangle preferred       
   Wave preferred       
   We prefer        
    
28 £20 Marks and Spencer Voucher.  £25 Gardening Voucher 
    
   Triangle preferred       
   Wave preferred       
   We prefer        
    
29 £60 Marks and Spencer Voucher  Voucher for Day Spa for 2 people 
    
   Triangle preferred       
   Wave preferred       
   We prefer        
    
30 Man’s watch (choice of 3)  ‘Constellation’ 3 piece trolley case luggage set. 
    
   Triangle preferred       
   Wave preferred       
   We prefer        
 
